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Should Explanations Omit the Details? 
 
Abstract 
There is a widely shared belief that the higher level sciences can provide better explanations than 
lower level sciences. But there is little agreement about exactly why this is so. It is often suggested 
that higher level explanations are better because they omit details. I will argue instead that the 
preference for higher level explanations is just a special case of our general preference for informative, 
logically strong, beliefs. I argue that our preference for informative beliefs entirely accounts for why 
higher level explanations are sometimes better に and sometimes worse に than lower level 
explanations. The result is a step in the direction of the unity of science hypothesis. 
 
1. Introduction 
2. Background: Is Omitting Details an Explanatory Virtue? 
 2.1. Anti-reductionist arguments 
 2.2. Reductionist argument 
 2.3 Logical strength 
3. Bases, Links and Logical Strength 
ヴく F┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS FﾗSﾗヴげゲ Aヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ 
5. Two Generalizations 
6. Should the Base Really be Maximally Strong? 
7. Anti-Reductionist Arguments Regarding the Base 
8. Should the Antecedent of the Link Really be Maximally Weak? 
 
1. Introduction 
It is widely believed that explanations can be improved by omitting details. But why is it good to omit 




information. I will argue to the contrary に explanations are always improved by adding information. 
And sometimes we can increase the information provided by omitting details. This looks paradoxical, 
but happens in the antecedent of a conditional; omitting details from the antecedent of a conditional 
logically strengthens the conditional, providing us with more information.  
 In the background is the hypothesis of the unity of science (Carnap 1934, Nagel 1951, 
Oppenheim and Putnam 1958). LWデ けデｴW ｴｷｪｴWヴ ﾉW┗Wﾉ ゲIｷWﾐIWゲげ ヴWaWヴ デﾗ ;ﾉﾉ ゲIｷWﾐIWゲ ﾗデｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ 
fundamental physics. One part of the hypothesis of the unity of science is that fundamental physics 
provides better explanations than higher level science. An important line of objection draws on 
examples to argue that omitting details improves an explanation, and that higher level explanations 
are better because they omit such details (Putnam 1967, Fodor 1974). I will argue that the wrong 
moral has been drawn from these examples. They show that logically strong explanations are better; 
tｴW┞ Sﾗﾐげデ ゲｴﾗ┘ デｴ;デ ｴｷｪｴWr level explanations are better. Thus, one objection to the unity of science 
hypothesis is undermined.  
 Part 2 explains the background reductionist and anti-reductionist arguments; part 3 contains 
the core argument, introducing the distinction between links and bases and applying it to explanations 
that omit details; part 4 applies the distinction to functionalism, arguing that functional laws are 
logically weak, and therefore provide poor explanations; part 5 generalizes the account along two 
dimensions; part 6 develops the view that the base should be logically strong; part 7 defends the view 
that the base should be logically strong from G;ヴaｷﾐﾆWﾉげゲ ふヱΓΒヱぶ objections; part 8 defends the view 
that the link should be logically strong; part 9 concludes. 
 
 
2. Background: Is Omitting Details an Explanatory Virtue? 
TｴW デﾗヮｷI ﾗa デｴｷゲ ヮ;ヮWヴ ｷゲ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐく WWげﾉﾉ aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa W┗Wﾐデゲが ゲWtting aside 
W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デﾗヴ┞ ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾉ;┘ゲく LWデげゲ ;ゲゲ┌ﾏW ┘W ｴ;┗W ; token event that is predicted with the same 




which explanation is better? Anti-reductionists favour higher level explanations; reductionists favour 
lower level explanations.1 In this section I will explain the opposing arguments, then suggest how they 
can be reconciled. 
 (Good-making features of explanations give us pro tanto reasons to believe them i.e. reasons 
which may by outweighed by other features. So all comparisons about which explanation is better 
should be understood ;ゲ ｴ;┗ｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ ｷﾏヮﾉｷIｷデ けﾗデｴWヴ デｴｷﾐｪゲ Wケ┌;ﾉげ Iﾉ;┌ゲWくぶ 
 
2.1. Anti-reductionist arguments 
The driving force behind many anti-reductionist arguments are well-known examples: 
 
P┌デﾐ;ﾏげゲ Peg (Putnam 1967) 
Explanandum: A square peg with 1 inch sides fails to go through a round hole with 
a diameter of 1 inch.  
Higher level explanation: The peg is square  
Lower level explanation: A description of the position of every molecule of the peg 
and hole. 
 
G;ヴaｷﾐﾆWﾉげゲ Rabbit (Garfinkel 1981) 
Explanandum: Rabbit r gets eaten.  
Higher level explanation: The fox population is high  
Lower level explanation: Rabbit r passed through the capture space of fox f. 
 
Y;Hﾉﾗげゲ Pigeon (Yablo 1992) 
Explanandum: A pigeon trained to peck at red cards pecks at a scarlet card.  
                                                          
1 Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴW WWゲﾉ;ﾆW ヲヰヱヰく HW SｷゲI┌ゲゲWゲ ヴWS┌Iデｷﾗﾐ ;ゲ F┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉｷゲﾏぎ けデｴ;デ デｴWヴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗ SｷﾏWﾐゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa 
explanatory depth along which the nonfundamental sciences can provide deeper explanations than those 




Higher level explanation: The card is red  
Lower level explanation: The card is scarlet. 
 
The Glass (Jackson and Pettit 1992) 
Explanandum: The sealed glass, in which water was heated, cracked.  
Higher level explanation: Water was boiling  
Lower level explanation: Molecule A hit the glass with momentum greater than z. 
 
The Conductor (Jackson and Pettit 1992) 
Explanandum: The conductor was annoyed.  
Higher level explanation: Someone coughed  
Lower level explanation: Bob coughed. 
 
Thermodynamics (Strevens 2014)2 
Explanandum: The gas filled the vacuum.  
Higher level explanation: The gas is at 100 Kelvin  
Lower level explanation: The gas consists of a billion molecules moving with 
velocities V1-V1,000,000,000 
 
TｴWヴW ;ヴW SｷaaWヴWﾐIWゲ HWデ┘WWﾐ デｴWゲW W┝;ﾏヮﾉWゲ デｴ;デ ┘Wげﾉﾉ ;SSヴWゲゲ ﾉ;デWヴき aﾗヴ ﾐﾗ┘が ┘ｴ;デ ﾏ;デデWヴゲ ｷゲ ┘ｴ;デ 
they have in common. These examples are often taken to show that explanations should omit details, 
from which it seems to follow that higher level explanations can be better than lower level 
explanations3. 
                                                          
2 This is the closest I will get to engaging with a specific science. As my thesis is general, it would be distracting 
to spend too much time engaging with the details of a specific example. 
3 See Putnam 1967 p.138, Fodor 1974 p. 103, Garfinkel 1981 p.56, Jackson and Pettit 1992 p.11, and also 




But why is it good to omit details? I will briefly survey the literature and argue that no 
convincing reason has been given to think that omitting details is an explanatory virtue (where an 
explanatory virtue is a good-making feature of an explanation).  
First, perhaps details should be omitted when alternative details would have produced the 
same event. Such details would not make a difference to the outcome, and perhaps explanations 
should only mention features that a make a difference to the outcome.4  
But now we need a specification of what the alternative details are. This suggests a contrastive 
theory of explanation (in the explanans at least), according to which A rather than B explains E. I will 
argue in section 7.2 that contrastive explanations do not imply that details are irrelevant.  
Second, Weslake (2010) suggests the following answer: 
 
Why believe that [omitting details] provides a genuine [virtue]? My central 
Iﾉ;ｷﾏぐｷゲ デｴ;デ ぷthat omitting details is a virtue] provides the best explanation for 
the truth of [the thesis that higher level explanations can give better explanations]. 
p.288 
 
But this is circular if the ultimate aim is to explain why higher level explanations are better 
than lower level explanations. Grant that if omitting details is a virtue, then this explains why higher 
level explanations can give better explanations. But this is no argument that omitting details is a virtue. 
The reductionist denies that higher level explanations can give better explanations, so has no need of 
an explanation of it. Furthermore, we have been given no account of why omitting details is a virtue 
ふ┘Wげ┗W ﾗﾐﾉ┞ HWWﾐ デﾗﾉS デｴ;デ ; ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIW aﾗヴ ｴｷｪｴWヴ ﾉW┗Wﾉ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲ I;ﾐ HW W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐWS ｷa ﾗﾏｷデデｷﾐｪ 
                                                          
others; see Sawyer 2002 for a helpful overview. Technically, it is said we should omit irrelevant details. But this 
ケ┌;ﾉｷaｷI;デｷﾗﾐ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ ;SS ;ﾐ┞デｴｷﾐｪく Oa Iﾗ┌ヴゲW ┘W ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗデ ﾗﾏｷデ ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ SWデ;ｷﾉゲく Aﾐ┞┘;┞が I ┘ｷll argue 
that omitting details is not a fundamental virtue, so relevance plays no role in my account. 




details is a ┗ｷヴデ┌Wぶく AﾐS WWゲﾉ;ﾆWげゲ ;IIﾗ┌ﾐデ ﾉW;┗Wゲ ﾗヮWﾐ デｴ;デ ┘W ﾏｷｪｴデ aｷﾐS ; HWデデWヴ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾗヴ デｴW 
benefits of higher level explanation に indeed this is what I will suggest. 
 Third, perhaps explanations with fewer details can explain more actual events. Consider an 
attempt to explain some particular actual event E. Suppose T1 explains only E; T2 explains E and also 
(actual event) F. Someone might argue that the fact that T2 also explains F makes T2 a better 
explanation of E.  
 But how could explaining F improve the quality of the explanation of E? Surely the fact that 
T2 also explains F has nothing to do with how well T2 explains E. 
 “ﾗﾏWﾗﾐW Iﾗ┌ﾉS ヴWヮﾉ┞ デｴ;デ ┘W ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉSﾐげデ aﾗI┌ゲ ﾗﾐﾉ┞ ﾗﾐ Eき デｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ Tヲ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐゲ E-and-F, while 
T1 only explains E, makes T2 the better explanation. But then T2 predicts more evidence so is more 
empirically adequate. And of course empirical adequacy is an explanatory virtue. So we have no reason 
here to posit omitting details as an explanatory virtue beyond its role in empirical adequacy.  
 Fourth, one might argue that less detailed explanations are less sensitive to the initial 
conditions, and that being less sensitive to the initial conditions is an explanatory virtue.5 WWげﾉﾉ ゲ;┞ 
that explanations that are relatively insensitive to the initial conditions are counterfactually robust.  
Counterfactual robustness does seem to be an explanatory virtue. In fact, I think it is. But why is 
counterfactual robustness an explanatory virtue?  
 PWヴｴ;ヮゲ ｷデげゲ ; a┌ﾐS;ﾏWﾐデ;ﾉ a;Iデ ;Hﾗ┌デ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ Iﾗ┌ﾐデWヴa;Iデ┌;ﾉ ヴﾗH┌ゲデﾐWゲゲ ｷゲ ; ┗ｷヴデ┌Wく 
I have no objection to this view, but we should only posit fundamental facts when necessary. It will 
emerge that on my account, counterfactual robustness might be a virtue, but is not a fundamental 
virtue; counterfactual robustness is a good feature of an explanation to the extent that it indicates 
that the explanation is logically strong.  
  
2.2. Reductionist arguments 
                                                          




“ﾗ a;ヴ Iげ┗W ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ ｷデげゲ not obvious why omitting details is a virtue of explanations. And there are 
powerful arguments that adding details improves explanations に details that might only be described 
using the concepts of a lower level science.6 Here are a few examples: 
 
Non-detailed: Socrates died because he drank poison 
Detailed: Socrates died because he drank hemlock.  
 
Non-detailed: Bob is crying because she is either happy or sad 
Detailed: Bob is crying because she is happy.   
 
Non-detailed: The building collapsed because it was structurally unsound 
Detailed: The building collapsed because tension in the concrete keystone caused 
a crack.  
 
In these cases the detailed explanations seem to be better, suggesting that lower level explanations 
are better.  
 Furthermore, tｴW ヮヴWaWヴWﾐIW aﾗヴ SWデ;ｷﾉゲ ｷゲ Wﾏヮｴ;ゲｷ┣WS H┞ ﾗﾐW ゲデヴ;ﾐS ﾗa デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ ｷﾐ デｴW けﾐW┘ 
ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲデｷIげ ヮｴｷﾉﾗゲﾗヮｴ┞ ﾗa ゲIｷWﾐIW に Machamer, Darden, and Craver 2000, Darden and Craver 2002, 
Darden 2006 and Craver 2007 emphasize completeness and specificity as an explanatory virtue.7 
Darden 2007 is perhaps the most explicit: 
 
A mechanism sketch is an incomplete model of a mechanism. It characterizes some 
ヮ;ヴデゲが ;Iデｷ┗ｷデｷWゲ ﾗヴ aW;デ┌ヴWゲ ﾗa デｴW ﾏWIｴ;ﾐｷゲﾏげゲ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐが H┌デ ｷデ leaves 
                                                          
6 For other defences of reductionism see Kim (1992, 1993), Sober (1999) and Dizadji-Bahmani, Frigg and 
Hartmann (2010). 




ｪ;ヮゲぐぷPへヴﾗHﾉWﾏ;デｷI;ﾉﾉ┞が ゲﾗﾏWデｷﾏWゲ ぷデｴW ｪ;ヮゲへ ;ヴW ﾏ;ゲﾆWS H┞ aｷﾉﾉWヴ デWヴﾏゲ デｴ;デ ｪｷ┗W 
the illusion that the explanation is complete when it is not. p.113 
 
AﾐS EﾉゲデWヴ ふヱΓΒンぶ ┘ヴｷデWゲ デｴ;デ けデﾗ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ ｷゲ デﾗ ヮヴﾗvide a mechanism, to open up the black box and show 
the nuts and bolts, the cogs and wheWﾉゲ ﾗa デｴW ｷﾐデWヴﾐ;ﾉ ﾏ;IｴｷﾐWヴ┞げ ふヮくヲンぶく  
 So we have a puzzle に sometimes extra details seem to improve an explanation and sometimes 
fewer details seem to improve an explanation. Michael Strevens (2011) puts his finger on the tension: 
 
On the one hand, we say that an explanation is deep when it goes far down toward 
the physical level, the level of detail at which ultimate causal underpinnings are 
found. On the other hand, we also say that an explanation is deep when it has a 
certain striking generality - when it attributes the phenomenon to be explained 
not to some very particular set of initial conditions, but to some high-level, 
abstract, often virtually mathematical state of affairs. 
 
He aptly calls this the Goldilocks problem (Strevens 2008) - that of characterizing what it is for an 
explanation to be just right in its level of detail. My approach dissolves this problem. Rather than 
conflicting desiderata, I will argue that there is only one desideratum, and the apparent tension comes 
from failing to distinguish the two parts of an explanation. 
  
2.3 Logical strength 
I suggest we focus on logical strength. My thesis is:  
 
Logical strength is an explanatory virtue.8  
 
                                                          




ふIげﾉﾉ デ;ﾆW ﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ゲデヴWﾐｪデｴ デﾗ HW Wケ┌ｷ┗;ﾉWﾐデ デﾗ informativeness ｷくWく  けA ｷゲ ﾏﾗヴW ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W デｴ;ﾐ Bげ ﾏW;ﾐゲ 
that A entails B (and B does not entail A).)  
 Usually adding details increases logical strength; but in the antecedent of a conditional the 
usual effects are reversed. More details means less information. This accounts for the tension. Positing 
a preference for logical strength explains our judgments about omitting details and higher level 
explanations.  
The issue is complicated by the fact that there are two ways of moving from a lower level to 
a higher level explanation. One way is to omit details; the other is to use a functional concept. 
Example: 
 
Start with the lower level explanation that someone died because they ingested 
cyanide. 
(A) We can generate a higher level explanation by omitting details of the chemical, 
and saying only that ingesting a substance in the cyano group (of which cyanide is 
a member) caused death.  
(B) Alternatively, we could say that ingesting a poison caused death, where 
けヮﾗｷゲﾗﾐげ ｷゲ ┌ﾐSWヴゲデﾗﾗS デﾗ ヴWaWヴ デﾗ ;ﾐ┞デｴｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ I;┌ゲWゲ Sｷゲデ┌ヴH;ﾐIWゲ ｷﾐ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲﾏゲ 
ｷくWく けヮﾗｷゲﾗﾐげ ｷゲ ; functional term.  
 
Higher level laws9 generated by omitting details in the antecedent (A) are logically stronger than lower 
level laws; the claim that all substances in the cyano group cause death is stronger than the claim that 
cyanide causes death. Higher level laws generated by using functional concepts (B) are logically weaker 
than lower level laws; the claim that poisons cause death is weaker than the claim that cyanide causes 
                                                          
9 I Sﾗﾐげデ ｴﾗﾉS デｴ;デ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾐWWS デﾗ Iﾗﾐデ;ｷﾐ ﾉ;┘ゲが ゲﾗ I ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS ゲ;┞ けｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉｷ┣;デｷﾗﾐげが ﾗヴ けI;┌ゲ;ﾉ ゲデ;デWﾏWﾐデげが ﾗヴ 




death. So I will argue that omitting details in the antecedent of the law improves the explanation 
(section 3) while moving to a functional law worsens the explanation (section 4).   
 
3. Bases, Links and Logical Strength 
Explanations have two parts に a basis and a link.10 This division is explicit in Hempel and Oppenheim 
(1948) for whom  
 
けデｴW W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;ﾐゲ a;ﾉﾉゲ ｷﾐデﾗ デ┘ﾗ ゲ┌HIﾉ;ゲゲWゲき  
ﾗﾐW ﾗa デｴWゲW Iﾗﾐデ;ｷﾐゲぐゲWﾐデWﾐIWゲぐwhich state specific antecedent conditions;  
the other is a seデ ﾗa ゲWﾐデWﾐIWゲぐ┘ｴｷIｴ ヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ ﾉ;┘ゲげ p.137.  
 
The antecedent conditions are the basis, and the law is the link. It is widely agreed that explanations 
do not need to appeal to laws; but I will assume we need some kind of conditional to link the basis to 
the thing-to-be-explained.11 
 Now return to my claim that good explanations should be as informative as possible. How are 
conditionals logically strengthened? Conditionals are logically strengthened by weakening the 
antecedent.12 For example,  
けｷa ┞ﾗ┌ ヮﾉ;┞ ┘Wﾉﾉ デｴWﾐ ┞ﾗ┌ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ┘ｷﾐげ 
is logically strengthened by weakening the antecedent with a disjunct: 
けｷa ┞ﾗ┌ ヮﾉ;┞ ┘Wﾉﾉ ﾗヴ ヮﾉ;┞ ;Hﾗ┗W ;┗Wヴ;ｪW デｴWﾐ ┞ﾗ┌ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ┘ｷﾐげく 
So the most informative conditionals have the weakest antecedents i.e. have the fewest details in the 
antecedents. This is where details should be omitted に in the antecedent of the conditional. And this 
improves the explanation by making it more informative. This is why higher level explanations are 
sometimes better than lower level explanations. 
                                                          
10 See Schaffer (forthcoming) 
11 Or at least, my account will only apply to explanations containing conditionals. 




 Consider J;Iﾆゲﾗﾐ ;ﾐS PWデデｷデげゲ example of the conductor who is annoyed because someone 
coughed. It is Bob who coughed, but anyone coughing would have annoyed the conductor. Should an 
explanation ﾗa デｴW IﾗﾐS┌Iデﾗヴげゲ ;ﾐﾐﾗ┞;ﾐIW include the fact that it was Bob who coughed? The anti-
reductionist says けﾗﾏｷデ Bobげ; the reductionist says けinclude Bobげ. How to reconcile these conflicting 
intuitions? I suggest that we can accommodate both intuitions by noting that the most informative, 
logically strong, link SﾗWゲﾐげデ ﾏWﾐデｷﾗﾐ BﾗH. 
 
Logically weak link: If Bob coughs then the conductor is annoyed  
Logically strong link: If someone coughs then the conductor is annoyed 
 
By contrast, when it comes to the base, adding the lower level details increases logical strength.  
 
Logically weak basis: Someone coughed 
Logically strong basis: Bob coughed 
 
Putting these together, the most informative explanation is: 
 
Logically strong basis: Bob coughed 
Logically strong link: If someone coughs then the conductor is annoyed 
Result: The conductor is annoyed 
  
We can now explain what is correct about the intuition that details should be omitted; details should 
be omitted from the antecedent of the link. And we can explain the apparently conflicting intuition 
that details should be included in explanations; details should be included in the base.  
 Notice that the result that good explanations are insensitive to initial conditions falls out of 




the link. The more detailed the antecedent of the link, the more sensitive the explanation to initial 
conditions. This account recommends logically strong links, which means antecedents with fewer 
details, which means explanations which are insensitive to initial conditions.13  
 Also, I remain neutral on whether there are other explanatory virtues besides logical strength. 
I only claim that the virtue of omitting details can be reduced to the virtue of logical strength. 
One last point before concluding this section. So far I have argued that logical strength is an 
W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デﾗヴ┞ ┗ｷヴデ┌Wく LWデげゲ ;ｪ;ｷﾐ ;ゲﾆ デｴW SWWヮWヴ ケ┌Wゲデｷﾗﾐぎ ┘ｴ┞ ｷゲ ﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ ゲデヴWﾐｪデｴ ;ﾐ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デﾗヴ┞ ┗ｷヴデ┌Wい 
I suggest: logical strength is a virtue of any belief に it is good to be informed. Thus the explanatory 
virtue of informativeness reduces to a virtue of any belief に that it be logically strong.14 
There is a further question of course: why is logical strength a virtue of beliefs? I think there 
is an answer to be found, which I can only gesture at here. It is widely believed that belief aims at 
truth.15 So truth is a norm of belief. But there must also be other norms of belief に otherwise, the 
HWﾉｷWa デｴ;デ ヱЩヱЭヲ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW ;ゲ ｪﾗﾗS ;ゲ ;ﾐ┞ HWﾉｷWa Iﾗ┌ﾉS HW ふHWI;┌ゲW ｷデ ｷゲ デヴ┌Wぶく Wｴ;デげゲ ﾉ;Iﾆｷﾐｪ ｷﾐ デｴW 
HWﾉｷWa デｴ;デ ヱЩヱЭヲ ｷゲ デｴ;デ ｷデげゲ ﾐﾗデ informative.16 It would be better to have a more informative belief 
(other things/virtues equal). Thus, it seems that logical strength is a virtue of a belief.  
Iげﾏ ﾐﾗデ ゲ;┞ｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ logical strength and truth are the only norms of belief. Presumably 
evidence is also part of the story, to name just one more. But it is very plausible that logical strength 
is a virtue of belief. There is more to say developing this thought, but the philosopher of science can 
rest content that a question about explanatory virtues has been reduced to a question about the 
norms of belief. 
                                                          
13 So the preference for logical strength also explains the preference for the counterfactual dependence 
relations emphasized by Woodward and Hitchcock (2003a, 2003b). 
14 Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴW LW┘ｷゲ けWｴ;デ I ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ゲ;┞ｷﾐｪ ぷ;Hﾗ┌デ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デﾗヴ┞ ┗ｷヴデ┌Wゲへ ;ヮヮﾉｷWゲ ﾃ┌ゲデ ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ デﾗ ;Iデゲ ﾗa ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSｷﾐｪ 
ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ;Hﾗ┌デ ;ﾐ┞ ﾉ;ヴｪW ;ﾐS IﾗﾏヮﾉｷI;デWS ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWぐTｴW ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWSが ;ﾐS デｴW ;Iデ ﾗa ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSｷﾐｪ ｷデが 
can be satisfactory or not in preciseﾉ┞ デｴW ゲ;ﾏW ┘;┞ゲくげ ふヱΓΒヶ ヮくヲヲΑ-8) Lewis is talking about pragmatics here, 
but I think the same applies to objective norms. 
15 See Whiting 2012 for discussion and references. 
16 Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴWぎ けScience does not aim, primarily, at high probabilities. It aims at a high informative content, well 




 LWデげゲ ﾐﾗ┘ work through the consequences for functional explanations. 
 
4. F┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS FﾗSﾗヴげゲ Aヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ 
A functional property is a property that is characterized in terms of what it does. That is, functional 
properties are individuated by their causal profile.17 
 FﾗSﾗヴげゲ ふヱΓΓΑぶ ;ヴｪ┌ﾏWﾐデ aﾗヴ a preference for functional explanations is especially interesting: 
 
ぷTｴWへ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲデぐゲデｷﾉﾉ ﾐWWSゲ デﾗ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ ┘ｴ┞ ┘W ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉSぐヮヴWaWヴ ｴｷｪｴWヴ ﾉW┗Wﾉ IﾉﾗゲWS 
laws (pain leads to avoidance) to lower level open laws (states that are RI v R2 v ... 
lead to avoidance), all else equal. Why are we prepared to buy closed laws at the 
cost of reifying high level properties? My story is that this policy complies with an 
injunction that all of our inductive practice illustrates: Prefer the strongest claim 
compatible with the evidence, all else equal. p. 159 
 
I have been arguing for something like the claim that Fodor makes in the final sentence, though I would 
put it as follows: logical strength is an explanatory virtue. 
 But I want to argue that Fodor has got the implications for functionalism the wrong way round. 
Fodor suggests that functional links are logically stronger than lower level links. I will argue that 
functional links are logically weaker than lower level links.  
 In fact functional links ;ヴW デヴｷ┗ｷ;ﾉが ﾉW;Sｷﾐｪ ゲﾗﾏW デﾗ ┘ﾗヴヴ┞ デｴ;デ デｴW┞ Sﾗﾐげデ ゲ┌IIWWS ;ゲ 
explanations at all. Ironically, Fodor himself had expressed this worry with a characteristically clear 
and colourful example that has become common currency18:  
 
                                                          
17 B┞ けa┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ I ﾏW;ﾐ デｴW ‘;ﾏゲW┞-Carnap-Lewis theory described by Lewis (1970, 1972). This should be 
Sｷゲデｷﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴWS aヴﾗﾏ ﾗデｴWヴ ┌ゲWゲ ﾗa けa┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ Wくｪく “ｴﾗemaker (2003), which I set aside 
18 Fodor goes on to give an answer by appealing to Turing machines, but this seems to restrict the scope of 





The second problem isぐ; ﾉ┌ヴﾆｷﾐｪ ゲ┌ゲヮｷIｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉぐW┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐぐｷゲ ﾃ┌ゲデ デﾗﾗ 
easy. Moliere had a finger on it:  
In virtue of what did the morphine put Jones to sleep?...In virtue of its having 
dormative power. In what does having this dormative power consist? It consists in 
being the cause of a certain kind of effect; viz. in causing sleep. Fodor (1981) p.12 
Italics original 
 
The poor explanation of Jones being put to sleep is something like:  
 
Basis: Jones took something with a dormative power 
Link: Substances with dormative powers cause sleep (i.e. if someone takes a 
substance with a dormative power then it puts them to sleep) 
Result: Jones was put to sleep 
 
And the link tells us nothing about the world. It is analytic に a Carnap-sentence (see Carnap 1963 p.964, 
Lewis 1970, 1972).19 Thus functional links are logically weak, and FﾗSﾗヴげゲ ;aaｷヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ ┘W ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS 
prefer logically stronger explanations ends up counting against functionalism. 20  (And we can explain 
the intuitive unsatisfactoriness of the functional link in terms of its being uninformative に this fits with 
my position that informativeness is an explanatory virtue.)  
LWデげゲ ｷﾐ┗Wゲデｷｪ;デW ┘ｴWデｴWヴ ┘W Iﾗ┌ﾉS ｴ;┗W ;ﾐ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ link. We could start with a 
link that mentions a realizer e.g. 
 
Link: If something aｷヴWゲ ´-opioid receptors then it puts people to sleep 
 
                                                          
19 I Sﾗ ﾐﾗデ ｷﾐデWﾐS デﾗ HW IﾗﾏﾏｷデデWS デﾗ ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ ﾗaデWﾐ I;ﾉﾉWS け;ﾐ;ﾉ┞デｷI a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ;ﾐS ｷゲ Sｷゲデｷﾐｪ┌ｷゲｴWS aヴﾗﾏ 
けヮゲ┞Iｴﾗ-a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉｷゲﾏげ ふゲWW LW┗ｷﾐ ヲヰヱヶぶく 




And we could logically strengthen the explanation by adding a disjunct to the antecedent of the link: 
 
Link: If something aｷヴWゲ ´-opioid receptors or k-opiod receptors then it puts people 
to sleep 
 
Dﾗﾐげデ a┌ﾐIデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ links have exactly this disjunctive structure, making them logically stronger than links 
without the disjunction?  
 No. Functional links do not have the structure above, in which adding a disjunct to the 
antecedent provides additional information about the realizers in the actual world. Functional 
properties are individuated by their causal powers, and are independent of the actual realizers.   
We can use disjunctions to state something extensionally equivalent to a functional link if we 
refer to other possible worlds21:  
 
Link: If something fires H receptors in humans in possible world 1 or fires J 
receptors in humans in possible world 2 ﾗヴぐ then it puts them to sleep 
 
This link is non-analytic but still necessary に it is true in all possible worlds, so it is maximally weak and 
uninformative.22 So as far as the virtue of logical strength goes, it is just as bad an explanation as a 
functional explanation. 
                                                          
21 “WW CﾗｴWﾐ ヲヰヰヲぎ けデｴe dispositions a thing has depends crucially on the operative laws of nature: in worlds 
where the laws of nature are different, none of the [actual realizers] need serve as the basis for the disposition 
fragility. Consequently, we must take into account the (perhaps infinitely many) low-level configurations that 
ゲWヴ┗W ;ゲ デｴW H;ゲｷゲ aﾗヴ デｴW Sｷゲヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ ;デ W;Iｴ ┘ﾗヴﾉS ┘ЭっЭ を ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉげく ヮくΒヰ (Cohen here assumes that the causal 
profiles of properties are not essential to them. Thanks to a referee for emphasizing this.) 
22 Fodor (1974) puts great stock in the distinction between infinite lists of realizers and functional properties, 
but the link is maximally weak either way. And this is another problem with the 1997 Fodor quote above. 
Fodor implies that higher level closed laws are logically stronger than lower level open laws; it seems to me 




 The views I wish to defend are now on the table. I have argued that logical strength is an 
explanatory virtue. This accounts for our intuitions in examples where omitting details looks virtuous 
に explanations can be improved by omitting details if (and only if23) doing so makes the explanation 
logically stronger. The result is that higher level links formed by omitting details from lower level links 
provide better explanations; higher level links formed by using functional predicates provide worse 
explanations. It remains to generalize from these examples and respond to objections. 
 
5. Two Generalizations 
We need to make two generalizations to cover the examples discussed in the literature. 
 The first generalization extends our analysis to two other types of explanation. Like Hempel 
and Oppenheim, we focussed on causal explanations, which have antecedent conditions as bases and 
some kind of causal connection as links; but there are also metaphysical and logical explanations. 
 Metaphysical explanations have relatively fundamental states as bases and grounding 
principles ;ゲ ﾉｷﾐﾆゲく Fﾗヴ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが デｴW ﾉｷﾐﾆ けｷa デｴWヴW ;ヴW ﾏﾗﾉWI┌ﾉWゲ ;ヴヴ;ﾐｪWS デ;HﾉW-wise then there is a 
デ;HﾉWげが IﾗﾏHｷﾐWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW H;ゲW デｴ;デ molecules are arranged table-wise, explains that there is a table. 
 Logical explanations have minor premises as bases and material conditionals as links. For 
W┝;ﾏヮﾉWが デｴW ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ けｷa A デｴWﾐ Bげが IﾗﾏHｷﾐWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ;ゲゲ┌ﾏヮデｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ Bが W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐゲ A.  
 
 Basis Link 
Causal/nomological Antecedent conditions Law/generalization 
Logical Minor premise Material conditional  
Metaphysical Relatively fundamental state Grounding principle  
  
 Recall P┌デﾐ;ﾏげゲ ﾗヴｷｪｷﾐ;ﾉ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWぎ 
                                                          






Linkぎ Ia ｷデげゲ ; ヱ ｷﾐIｴ ゲケ┌;ヴW ﾗHﾃWIt then it does not fit through circular holes with 
diameter 1 inch 
 
Although Putnam was defending higher level laws, he does not use a law of nature に it is not a law of 
ﾐ;デ┌ヴW デｴ;デ ヱ ｷﾐIｴ ゲケ┌;ヴWゲ Sﾗﾐげデ aｷデ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ヱ ｷﾐIｴ ｴﾗﾉWゲく Nor is it merely a counterfactual-supporting 
generalization. It is much more like a grounding principle. To be more precise, it seems to follow from 
principles of geometry as applied to actual space, so perhaps we need to add mathematical principles 
to the list of causal, metaphysical and logicalく TｴW W┝;Iデ ヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWゲ ┘ﾗﾐげデ ﾏ;デデWヴ ｴWヴW though; what 
matters is that we need some kind of conditional in the explanation, and conditionals can be 
strengthened by weakening the antecedent. And this is why explanations that describe the overall 
shapes of the peg and board can be better than those that describe the positions of the molecules. 
Moving from cauゲ;ﾉ デﾗ ﾏWデ;ヮｴ┞ゲｷI;ﾉ ﾗヴ ﾉﾗｪｷI;ﾉ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲ SﾗWゲﾐげデ Iｴ;ﾐｪW デｴｷゲく 
 The second generalization is needed because the concepts of the base can differ from the 
concepts of the antecedent of the link. Consider the explanation: 
 
Basis: The card is scarlet 
Link: If the card is red then the pigeon pecks 
Result: The pigeon pecks 
 
Logic does not connect scarletness with redness. We need grounding principles24. These could be 
packed into the link, but it is clearer to separate them. We would end up with something like: 
 
Basis: The card is scarlet 
Grounding principle: Scarlet is a determinate of red  
                                                          




Link: If the card is red then the pigeon pecks 
Result: The pigeon pecks 
 
So the second generalization extends the account to explanations which require a grounding principle. 
The main point remains に omitting details from the antecedent of the link improves the explanation. 
 One might now argue that explanations are better without grounding principles. I ┘ﾗﾐげデ ;ヴｪ┌W 
that they are; but if they are, and assuming bases should contain lower level concepts (perhaps 
because they are more informative) it follows that links should contain lower level concepts. The result 
would be that explanations in terms of the lowest level science are best. This is the explanatory 
reductionist position that the best explanations are given in terms of the lowest level science. For 
example, assuming that redness comes in just two varieties に scarlet and maroon に  the reductionist 
a;┗ﾗ┌ヴゲ けｷa デｴW I;ヴS ｷゲ ゲI;ヴﾉWデ ﾗヴ ﾏ;ヴﾗﾗﾐ デｴWﾐ デｴW ヮｷｪWﾗﾐ ヮWIﾆゲげ ﾗ┗Wヴ けｷa デｴW I;ヴS ｷゲ ヴWS デｴWﾐ デｴW ヮｷｪWﾗﾐ 
ヮWIﾆゲげく25  
 What anti-reductionist arguments are there for preferring links that use higher level concepts? 
There are three main arguments for favouring higher level links: they avoid disjunctive predicates, 
illuminate generalities  and are better at speaking to our interests (see Pereboom & Kornblith, 1991, 
Fodor 1974, 1997, Sober 1999, Clapp 2001, Batterman 200226).  
 These arguments all require further discussion, but none of them seem very strong. Wｴ;デげゲ 
wrong with disjunctive predicates? Why is it better to use a single predicate that just ties a bow around 
the disjunction? And if the disjunction is heterogenous, is there really any generality to be illuminated, 
                                                          
25 A different argument for this conclusion is given by Sider (2011), who argues that explanations should be 
given in joint-carving terms: さデｴWﾗヴｷWゲざ H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ Hｷ┣;ヴヴWが ﾐﾗﾐ-joint-carving classifications are unexplanatoryげ 
p.23 Aゲゲ┌ﾏｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ﾉﾗ┘Wヴ ﾉW┗Wﾉ IﾗﾐIWヮデゲ I;ヴ┗W ;デ デｴW ﾃﾗｷﾐデゲ HWデデWヴ デｴ;ﾐ ｴｷｪｴWヴ ﾉW┗Wﾉ IﾗﾐIWヮデゲが “ｷSWヴげゲ ヮﾗゲｷデｷﾗﾐ 
supports explanatory reductionism. I Sﾗﾐげデ デｴｷﾐﾆ ﾐﾗﾐ-joint-carving explanations are unexplanatory; I think they 
are not as good as joint-carving explanations. 
26 Batterman (2000, 2002, forthcoming) argues that the question the reductionist cannot answer is: (MR) How 
can systems that are heterogeneous at some (typically) micro-scale exhibit the same pattern of behavior at the 
macro-scale? This strikes me as analogous to the one over many argument for Platonism: how can two 
different objects, a and b, have the same property F? I am inclined to give the nominalist answer: in virtue of a 




as opposed to an illusion of a generality created by a higher level concept? If there is a genuine 
ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉｷデ┞が ┘ｴ┞ I;ﾐげデ デｴ;デ HW ｷﾉﾉ┌ﾏｷﾐ;デWS H┞ a lower level conditional connecting one effect with 
multiple causes? As for speaking to our interests, this is sensitive to the interests of the agent in 
question. It is hard to see that there are any morals to be drawn regarding objective explanatory 
virtues (I expand on objective vs. pragmatic virtues in the next section). But I will remain officially 
neutral on this debate about whether higher or lower level links are better; I claim only that logically 
strong links are better.  
 
6. Should the Base Really be Maximally Strong? 
These final three sections defend my account in more detail. This section defends the view that bases 
should be maximally strong, and the next (7) discusses G;ヴaｷﾐﾆWﾉげゲ objections. The final section (8) 
defends the view that links should be maximally strong from the problem of disjunctive explanations.  
 On my account, bases should contain as many details as possible, so details should be 
provided all the way down to the level of fundamental physics. This might appear odd. But I think it 
can be independently motivated. 
 Suppose an unusually curious Ancient Greek wants to know why Socrates died. She is told that 
he drank poison. Not fully satisfied, she asks which poison was drunk; a reasonable question, she is 
told he drank hemlock. But our unusually curious Ancient Greek is still not satisfied. What is the 
process by which hemlock killed Socrates? Surely another reasonable question, though not one any 
AﾐIｷWﾐデ GヴWWﾆ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ｴ;┗W ;ﾐゲ┘WヴWSく B┌デ ﾉWデげゲ ヮヴWデWﾐS ; ﾏﾗSWヴﾐ Hｷﾗﾉﾗｪｷゲデ ;ヴヴｷ┗Wゲ ;ﾐS W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐゲ デｴ;デ 
hemlock contains coniine, which disrupts the workings of the central nervous system. Will our curious 
Ancient Greek be satisfied? Perhaps not. She now asks what the process is by which coniine disrupts 
the central nervous system. A chemist arrives to explain how coniine paralyzes muscles by blocking 
the nicotinic receptors which cause muscular contraction. And how does it do that, our curious Ancient 
Greek now asks. A physicist is now needed to explain the interaction between the coniine and the 




step the explanation has improved. At what point is our curious Ancient Greek satisfied? Perhaps only 
once we have descended to the level of fundamental laws, where we are faced with phenomena that 
cannot be further explained. And only then is the explanation good enough to satisfy the curious 
Ancient Greek. 
Someone might object that this continual movement towards further details does not 
improve the explanation. After all, the behaviour of the curious Ancient Greek is not realistic; real 
people do not have either the time or the interest to pursue explanations into such details.  
We can block this objection using two distinctions. First, distinguish an ideal explanatory text, 
which contains all the information that could be relevant to explaining the event, from the non-ideal 
explanations that we actually give, and which are explanatory in virtue of conveying information about 
some portion of the ideal text.27 Ideal explanatory texts are theoretical infinitely long sentences that 
cannot be made better or worse; we are discussing the virtue of a given explanation. Second, 
distinguish the virtues that make a given explanation objectively better from pragmatic features that 
make an explanation useful. 28 
My account says that a given explanation objectively improves as it expands and moves closer 
to the ideal explanatory text; I allow that more details can pragmatically worsen a given explanation. 
For example, given explanations are subject to pragmatic principles of conversation.29 Giving too much 
ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ aﾉﾗ┌デゲ デｴW ゲWIﾗﾐS ｴ;ﾉa ﾗa GヴｷIWげゲ ふヱΓΑヵ ヮくヴヵぶ ﾏ;┝ｷﾏ ﾗa ケ┌;ﾐデｷデ┞ぎ けDﾗ ﾐﾗデ ﾏ;ﾆW ┞ﾗ┌ヴ 
IﾗﾐデヴｷH┌デｷﾗﾐ ﾏﾗヴW ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗W デｴ;ﾐ ｷゲ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWSげく AﾐS ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ ヴWケ┌ｷヴWS SWヮWﾐSゲ on what the subject 
wants to know.30 This accounts for the intuition that extra details can worsen the explanation. 
                                                          
27 Railton 1981 p.240 
28 For related comments about objective virtues, see Clapp 2001 p.135, Haug, 2011 p.1147; but also Pereboom 
& Kornblith, 1991 p.127 for dissent. 
29 HWヴW ┘W I;ﾐ ;ヮヮﾉ┞ デｴW W;ヴﾉｷWヴ LW┘ｷゲ ケ┌ﾗデW ;ﾐS ;ﾐ W┝デヴ; ゲWﾐデWﾐIW ;Hﾗ┌デ ヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷIゲぎ けWｴ;デ I ｴ;┗W been 
saying [about explanatory virtues] applies just as well to acts of providing information about any large and 
IﾗﾏヮﾉｷI;デWS ゲデヴ┌Iデ┌ヴWぐTｴW ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWSが ;ﾐS デｴW ;Iデ ﾗa ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSｷﾐｪ ｷデが I;ﾐ HW ゲ;デｷゲa;Iデﾗヴ┞ ﾗヴ ﾐﾗデ ｷﾐ 
precisely the same ways. There is nﾗ ゲヮWIｷ;ﾉ ゲ┌HﾃWIデぎ ヮヴ;ｪﾏ;デｷIゲ ﾗa W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげ ふヱΓΒヶ ヮくヲヲΑ-8) 





Equally, a curious subject who wants to know more details will find a more detailed 
explanation more useful. Thus, Elliott Sober (1999), resヮﾗﾐSｷﾐｪ デﾗ P┌デﾐ;ﾏげゲ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ デｴ;デ ﾏｷIヴﾗ-
properties are not explanatory writes:  
 
Perhaps the micro-details do not interest Putnam, but they may interest others, 
and for perfectly legitimate reasons. Explanations come with different levels of 
detail. When someone tells you more than you want to hear, this does not mean 
that what is said fails to be an explanation (p. 547).   
 
I would add: when someone tells you more than you want to hear, the given explanation objectively 
improves as it gets closer to the ideal explanatory text.  
 The objector might continue31: 
けObjection: “┌ヮヮﾗゲW ┘W ;SS デﾗ デｴW W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa “ﾗIヴ;デWゲげ SW;デｴ デｴ;デ ｴW ｴWﾉS デｴW 
cup with his left hand. This addition makes the explanation more informative, but 
surely does not impro┗W デｴW W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐくげ 
 
 In response, I maintain that the additional information does improve the explanation, and 
this can be demonstrated by consideration of cases where the additional information is needed for 
the explanation to succeed. Suppose you know that anyone who drinks hemlock with their right 
hand is given the antidote by Dexter, a deity who loves the right-handed. Knowing that Socrates is 
right-handed, you are puzzled as to why the hemlock killed Socrates. Where was Dexter? Your 
puzzlement is resolved only when you have the additional information that Socrates drank with his 
left hand this time. Generally, given the right background knowledge, anything can explain anything 
に a kind of explanation holism. It follows that for any given piece of information and any 
phenomenon, there are states of background knowledge where that piece of information explains 
that phenomenon. So the more information in the base, the more states of background knowledge 
allow the explanation to succeed, and the objectively better the explanation.  
                                                          




 The opposing intuition can be accounted for by the pragmatics. We have limited time and 
interest, so only want to hear information that is needed for the explanation to succeed given our 
background knowledge at the moment of explanation. But there is always more to know. 32 
 
7. Anti-Reductionist Arguments Regarding the Base 
My position is that the base should contain as much information ;ゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWく Aﾉデｴﾗ┌ｪｴ ｴW SﾗWゲﾐげデ ┌ゲW 
the link/base distinction, Garfinkel (1981) gives one of the most detailed arguments in the literature 
for removing information from the base, so it is worth going through his reasoning in detail.33 I will 
describe two arguments for removing information from the base, offer responses, then apply the 
ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲWゲ デﾗ G;ヴaｷﾐﾆWﾉげゲ W┝;ﾏヮﾉWく   
 
7.1. Lower level bases that omit information 
Suppose we boil water in a sealed glass container until the glass cracks. Compare the following bases: 
 
Basis 1: Molecule A hit the glass with momentum greater than z. 
Basis 2: The water was boiling.  
 
Basis 2 seems better. I agree. One might argue that basis 2 is better because it has less information 
than basis 1. Counterexample? 
 No. Basis 2 is not less informative than basis 1. (Neither entails the other.) B;ゲｷゲ ヱげゲ explanation 
in terms of molecule A omits any information about the other molecules に molecule A could have been 
moving freakishly fast by chance. So basis 1 is lower level but omits information. Basis 2, by saying the 
water was boiling, includes the information that the other molecules were moving fast as well. So this 
                                                          
32 Cﾗﾏヮ;ヴW LW┘ｷゲ ふヱΓΒヶ;ぶぎ けYour explanatory information is only partial. Yes. And so is any serving of 
explanatory information we will ever get . . . There is ;ﾉ┘;┞ゲ ﾏﾗヴW デﾗ ﾆﾐﾗ┘くげ  ヮくヲンΑ 





is not a case in which an explanation with less information is better. In fact neither is more informative 
than the other. 
To devise a case where the higher level explanation that uses the cﾗﾐIWヮデ ﾗa けHﾗｷﾉｷﾐｪげ is less 
informative, the lower level explanation would have to provide the details of the trajectories of many 
molecules に at least enough to necessitate that the water is boiling. So we need to compare basis 2 
with something like: 
 
Basis 3: Molecule A is at position L1 with momentum x1, Molecule B is at position 
Lヲ ┘ｷデｴ ﾏﾗﾏWﾐデ┌ﾏ ┝ヲぐ 
  
Basis 3 provides at least as much information as basis 2, making the explanation at least as good on 
my account. And this seems intuitively correct に for example, explanations with basis 3 are just as 
counterfactually robust as explanations with basis 2. Extra details appear to make the explanation 
worse only when we make explicit some details (about molecule A) and fail to say anything about the 
other details (the rest of the molecules). 
 
7.2. Contrast 
One might think that explanations with extra details invoke the wrong contrast class. I will argue that 
the contrast class is separable from the details provided.  
LWデげゲ grant that explanation is contrastive.34 That is, p rather than q explains x rather than y35.  
Hold fixed that we want to explain why the ヮｷｪWﾗﾐ ヮWIﾆWS ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ SｷSﾐげデ ヮWIﾆ. If we are offered 
the explanation of the scarlet card, we can contrast this with an explanation in terms of a maroon 
card. That is (leaving the link implicit): 
                                                          
34 WﾗﾗS┘;ヴSげゲ ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐｷゲデ ﾏﾗSWﾉ ﾗa W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷゲ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ ﾗa ;ゲ Iﾗﾐデヴ;ゲデｷ┗Wく 
35 Schaffer 2005 defends contrastive causation. The difference between contrastive causation and contrastive 
W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ┘ﾗﾐげデ ﾏ;デデWヴ ｴWヴWく Iデ ;ﾉゲﾗ SﾗWゲﾐげデ ﾏ;デデWヴ ｷa W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ヴW;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷゲ Iﾗﾐデヴ;ゲデｷ┗W に I am conceding the 





Failed microexplanation  
Basis: The card is scarlet rather than maroon 
Result: The ヮｷｪWﾗﾐ ヮWIﾆWS ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ SｷSﾐげデ ヮWIﾆ 
 
This purported explanation fails. The pigeon would have pecked at any shade of red.  
 But it is a mistake to infer that any detailed explanation in terms of scarlet fails. We just have 
to make sure that the relevant contrast class is one that does allow the scarletness to explain. And this 
in turn requires that the contrast class contains only possibilities where the pigeon does not peck.36 
For example: 
 
Successful microexplanation  
Basis: The card is scarlet rather than turquoise  
Result: TｴW ヮｷｪWﾗﾐ ヮWIﾆWS ヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ SｷSﾐげデ ヮWIﾆ 
 
7.3く G;ヴaｷﾐﾆWﾉげゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐ 
LWデげゲ ﾐﾗ┘ ;ヮヮﾉ┞ these two points デﾗ G;ヴaｷﾐﾆWﾉげゲ SｷゲI┌ゲゲｷﾗﾐく Garfinkelげゲ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ｷゲ デﾗ ;ヴｪ┌W aﾗヴ デｴW 
failure of the microexplanation of why a rabbit was eaten. My reply is that he makes both the illicit 
moves above. 
 Garfinkel first mentions that the micro level contains a huge amount of information, and then 
explicitly omits most of it:  
 
けデｴW ﾗ┗Wヴ;ﾉﾉ ﾐ;デ┌ヴW ﾗa デｴW ﾏｷIヴﾗﾉW┗Wﾉ ｷゲ ; ｴ┌ｪW-dimensional determinism37, which, 
given the complete description of all the equations of interaction between 
                                                          
36 See Franklin-Hall (2016 section 5). 




individual foxes and individual rabbits and given a complete specification of foxes 
and rabbits, tells us the individual destiny of every one of them at every future 
time. Extracting from this mass デｴW S;デ; ヴWﾉW┗;ﾐデ デﾗ ヴ;HHｷデ ヴが ┘W ﾉW;ヴﾐ デｴ;デぐデｴW 
microexplanation is therefore something like:  
Rabbit r was eaten because he passed through the capture space of fox f.げ p.55 
Italics added. 
 
By extracting from the mass of data, Garfinkel has omitted information from the lower level 
description.  
Second, once Garfinkel has focussed on the rabbitげゲ passing through the capture space of f, he 
invokes the conデヴ;ゲデ Iﾉ;ゲゲ ﾗa デｴW ヴ;HHｷデ ヮ;ゲゲｷﾐｪ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴ ゲﾗﾏW ﾗデｴWヴ aﾗ┝げゲ I;ヮデ┌ヴW ゲヮ;IW ;ﾐS IﾗﾐIﾉ┌SWゲぎ 
 
けThe object of the macroexplanation is why the rabbit was eaten rather than not 
eaten, while all the microexplanation tells us is why the rabbit was eaten by fox 
aぐヴ;デｴWヴ デｴ;ﾐ H┞ ゲﾗﾏW ﾗデｴWヴ aﾗ┝げ ヮく ヵヶ 
 
So Garfinkel correctly rejects: 
 
Failed microexplanation 
Basis: Rabbit r passed through the capture space of fox f1 rather than fox f2  
Result: Rabbit r was eaten rather than not eaten 
 
In response, we can give a microexplanation that a) gives at least as much information as the 
macroexplanation, and b) has a contrast class (involving a small fox population) that explains why the 





Successful microexplanation  
Basis: Rabbit r was at location l10 and foxes f1ぐf200 were at l1ぐﾉヲヰ0 respectively 
rather than rabbit r was at location l10 ;ﾐS aﾗ┝Wゲ aヱぐa9 were at l1ぐﾉ9 respectively. 
Result: Rabbit r was eaten rather than not eaten 
 
These points can be adapted to the other examples (though having conceded to the objector that 
explanation is contrastive, we have to modify some of the basesき ┘Wげﾉﾉ ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾉW;┗W the grounding 




Failed microexplanation  
Basis: The peg was square with structure S1 rather than square with structure S2. 
Result: The peg got stuck rather than going through the hole  
 
Successful microexplanation  
Basis: The peg was square with structure S1 rather than round with structure S3. 








Basis: Molecule A was the first38 to hit the glass with momentum greater than z 
rather than molecule B was the first to hit the glass with momentum greater than 
z 
Result: The glass cracked rather than stayed intact 
 
Successful microexplanation  
Basis: Molecule A hit the glass with momentum greater than z rather than no 
molecule hit the glass with momentum greater than z 




Failed microexplanation  
Basis: Bob coughed and Alice SｷSﾐげデ rather than Alice coughed and Bob SｷSﾐげデ39. 
Result: The conductor is annoyed rather than serene 
 
Successful microexplanation  
Basis: Bob coughed rather than no-one coughed. 




Failed microexplanation  
                                                          
38 This reference to the first molecule to hit the glass ensures that the contrasts are incompatible. (Molecule A 
hitting the glass with momentum greater than z is compatible with molecule B hitting the glass with 
momentum greater than z.) Thanks to x and y 
39 Why not just: Bob coughed rather than Alice coughed? Because these possibilities are compatible, so do not 




Basis: The gas had initial state A with velocities V1-V1,000,000,000 rather than initial 
state B with (different) velocities V1-V1,000,000,000. 
Result: The gas filled the vacuum rather than stayed in one corner 
 
Successful microexplanation  
Basis: The gas had initial state A with (non-zero) velocities V1-V1,000,000,000 rather 
than a billion stationary molecules. 
Result: The gas filled the vacuum rather than stayed in one corner 
 
8. Should the Antecedent of the Link Really be Maximally Weak? 
Compare the following explanations: 
 
Good explanation 
Base: Sandy is a man 
Weak link: If Sandy is a man then Sandy does not get pregnant. 
Result: Sandy does not get pregnant 
 
けProblematicげ explanation 
Base: Sandy is a man  
Disjunctive link: If Sandy is a man or Sandy takes birth control pills then Sandy does 
not get pregnant. 
Result: Sandy does not get pregnant 
 
According to my account, the disjunctive link is logically stronger than the weak link, so better than 




 The most important response dialectically is that competing theories of explanation face a 
similar problem. After all, if omitting details is a virtue, then adding disjunctions should improve the 




Base: Sandy is a man or Sandy takes birth control pills 
Disjunctive link: If Sandy is a man or Sandy takes birth control pills then Sandy does 
not get pregnant. 
Result: Sandy does not get pregnant 
 
Weslake (ms) calls this the problem of disjunctive explanations41 and shows it is a problem for Hempel 
and Oppenheim (1948), Kitcher (1981), Woodward (2003), Woodward and Hitchcock (2003b), and 
Strevens (2004; 2009). 
 My account does say something about why the Disjunctive Explanation is worse than the Good 
Explanation に the base is logically weak.42 So this example supports my theory over alternatives. 
 The problem case for me is where the base is held fixed and a disjunction is added to the link. 
Repeating from above: 
 
けProblematicげ explanation 
                                                          
40 We should also distinguish this case from one where the disjunct is irrelevant: 
Non-problematic explanation 
Base: Sandy is a man  
Strong link: If Sandy is a man or the Sun is yellow then Sandy does not get pregnant. 
Result: Sandy does not get pregnant 
I suggest we require conditionals in causal explanations to be stronger than the material conditional, which 
ensures this this link is false, so fails as an explanation (assuming that only the truth can explain).  
41 AIデ┌;ﾉﾉ┞ WWゲﾉ;ﾆWげゲ W┝;ﾏヮﾉW ｷゲ ゲﾉｷｪｴデﾉ┞ ﾏﾗヴW IﾗﾏヮﾉｷI;デWSが H┌デ I デ;ﾆW ｷデ デｴW ヮﾗｷﾐデ ｷゲ デｴW ゲ;ﾏWく 
42 Objecction: But this is balanced by the virtue that the link is logically strﾗﾐｪく ‘Wヮﾉ┞ぎ YWゲが Iげ┗W ;ゲゲ┌ﾏWS デｴW 
base is the trumping consideration. Perhaps there is a non-extreme exchange rate. And perhaps the exchange 




Base: Sandy is a man  
Disjunctive link: If Sandy is a man or Sandy takes birth control pills then Sandy does 
not get pregnant.  
Result: Sandy does not get pregnant 
 
One possible ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW ｷゲ デﾗ ;SS ; a┌ヴデｴWヴ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デﾗヴ┞ ┗ｷヴデ┌W デｴ;デ ヴ┌ﾉWゲ ﾗ┌デ Sｷゲﾃ┌ﾐIデｷ┗W ﾉｷﾐﾆゲき ┘Wげﾉﾉ 
consider a couple of ways to do that below. But I offer a different response: I maintain that this 
disjunctive link does improve the explanation. Why might someone thinﾆ デｴ;デ ｷデ SﾗWゲﾐげデい I can think 
of four reasons. 
 First, someone might object that the disjunctive link is not law-like, holding that explanations 
must be law-like. But the claim that explanations must be law-ﾉｷﾆW ｷゲ ｴｷｪｴﾉ┞ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗ┗Wヴゲｷ;ﾉく Iげﾏ ｷﾐIﾉｷﾐWS 
to a more liberal view に for example, Jenkins and Nolan (2008) give compelling arguments that there 
can even be backwards explanations. (Still, those who demand that links must be law-like can add this 
as a restriction and accept the rest of my account.).  
 Second, perhaps natural properties (Lewis 1983) in links explain better, and the disjunction 
けSandy is a man or Sandy デ;ﾆWゲ Hｷヴデｴ Iﾗﾐデヴﾗﾉ ヮｷﾉﾉゲげ ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ naturalく B┌デ I Sﾗﾐげデ デｴｷﾐﾆ デｴW preference for 
natural links can be maintained. Many intuitively good explanations are non-natural. For example, 
functional explanations are non-natural43. The explanation that someone died because they were 
poisoned is non-natural because so many different substances realize poisons.44 Furthermore, some 
think it is costly to wheel in metaphysically substantive concepts like naturalness.45 (Still, those who 
demand that links must be natural can add this as a restriction and accept the rest of my account.)  
 Third, we might be misled by focussing only on the link and ignoring the base. Franklin-Hall 
(2016) argues that interventionists are pushed towards disjunctive explanations, with the result that 
                                                          
43 My earlier objection to functional explanations is that they are logically weak, not that they are non-natural. 
44 Objection: Poisons are unified at the relevant (higher) level.  What unifies poisons is their ability to disturb 
organisms. Response: But on such a liberal account of unification, being a man and taking birth controls are 
unified, as both prevent pregnancy. 




けデｴW ｷﾐデWヴ┗Wﾐデｷﾗﾐｷゲデ ｷゲ ヴWIﾗﾏﾏWﾐSｷﾐｪ ┗Wヴ┞ ヮWI┌ﾉｷ;ヴが ;ﾐS ｷﾐ ゲﾗﾏW ヴWゲヮWIデゲ ┗Wヴ┞ ┌ﾐｷﾐaﾗヴﾏ;デｷ┗Wが 
explanations, those that don't go any way towards specifying the particular circumstance that brought 
;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW WaaWIデ デﾗ HW W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐWSげ (p.573). But on my account the link is not in the business of specifying 
the particular circumstances に that is for the base. 
 Fourth, dissatisfaction with disjunctive links may be due to the pragmatics. Recall that the 
ideal explanatory text contains every sentence that could be used in an explanation of the event. 
When we ask for explanations, we will not be happy to be given the ideal explanatory text, because 
we Sﾗﾐげデ ｴ;┗W デｴW デｷﾏW ﾗヴ Iﾗｪﾐｷデｷ┗W I;ヮ;Iｷデ┞ デﾗ ｴ;ﾐSﾉW ｷデ に we want the information that is relevant 
to usく TｴW W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ;Hﾗ┗W ｴ;┗W デｴW H;ゲW けSandy ｷゲ ; ﾏ;ﾐげく Tｴｷゲ ﾐ;デ┌ヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ｷﾐ┗ﾗﾆWゲ ; I;ゲW ┘ｴWヴW デｴW 
explainer に the person doing the explaining に knows Sandy is a man. If this explainer gives us the 
disjunctive link, they have violated GヴｷIWげゲ ふヱΓΑヵ ヮくヴヶぶ maxim: be relevant. They would violate the 
same maxim as someone who told you Bill was in the library or the pub, while knowing that Bill was 
at the pub. 
 But we can fill out the story so that the disjunctive link does not violate any pragmatic rules. 
Suppose an alien does not know whether men can get pregnant, SﾗWゲﾐげデ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ ┘ｴWデｴWヴ Sandy is a 
man or a woman, and is very interested in how pregnancy works, and why Sandy is not pregnant. They 
read a book on human biology. The first chapter tells them that men cannot get pregnant and women 
can. The second chapter tells them that women can avoid getting pregnant by taking birth control 
pills. When they learn that Sandy is a man, the explanation is complete. Would the explanation have 
been improved by omitting the second chapter of the book? Surely not. The second chapter gives the 
alien further knowledge about the causal dependencies associated with pregnancy; it gives the alien 
counterfactual knowledge about what would have happened if Sandy had turned out to be a woman 
taking birth control pills. So the disjunctive link is more useful to the alien than the weak link.  
 So there a number of reasons the disjunctive link might look problematic, but I think they can 






I have criticized the contemporary consensus that higher level explanations are better in virtue of 
omitting details. I agree that omitting details can be a virtue, but this is because omitting details can 
make an explanation logically stronger; logical strength is a fundamental explanatory virtue. So higher 
level explanations are better than lower level explanations when logically stronger and worse when 
logically weaker, other things equal. The situation is simpler for bases; in all the cases typically 
discussed, bases are improved by moving from higher level to lower level concepts, and this is because 
doing so increases logical strength. 
 One of the main arguments for anti-reductionism is the claim that omitting details makes an 
explanation better. If, as I have argued, it is logical strength that makes an explanation better, then 
this argument for anti-reductionism is undercut.  
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